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Sensor Fault Detection and Isolation: A Game Theoretic Approach 
This paper studies sensor fault detection using a game theoretic approach. Sensor 
fault detection is considered as change point analysis in the coefficients of a 
regression model. A new method for detecting faults, referred to as two-way fault 
detection, is introduced which defines a game between two players, i.e. the fault 
detectors. In this new strategic environment, assuming that the independent states 
of the regression model are known, the test statistics are derived and their finite 
sample distributions under the null hypothesis of no change are derived. These test 
statistics are useful for testing the fault existence, as well as, the pure and mixed 
Nash equilibriums are derived for at-most-one-change and epidemic change 
models. A differential game is also proposed and solved using the Pontryagin 
maximum principle. This solution is useful for studying the fault detection problem 
in unknown state cases. Kalman filter and linear matrix inequality methods are 
used in finding the Nash equilibrium for the case of unknown states. Illustrative 
examples are presented to show the existence of the Nash equilibriums. Also, the 
proposed fault detection scheme is numerically evaluated via its application on a 
practical system and its performance is compared with the cumulative sum method. 
Keywords: AMOC; Differential game; Epidemic model; Kalman filtering; LMI; 
Nash equilibrium; Pontryagin maximum principle; Two-way fault detection 
1. Introduction  
From industrial safety systems to sustainable plants, fault detection and isolation 
(FDI) techniques play an essential role to detect and isolate faults in systems as early as 
possible and to generate the critical information which will be used to remove the fault 
effect from the overall system and keep the performance at the desirable level till the next 
prescheduled maintenance procedure (Ren, Ding, & Li, 2017; Song and Guo, 2017). In 
fact, implementing active fault tolerant control, in which FDI is an important step to 
prepare the fault information, reduces the shutdown periods and unplanned maintenance, 
also it can be used to prevent the component faults from degrading further into 
catastrophic failure and increases system reliability, especially for systems operating in 
harsh environments, e.g. offshore wind turbines (H. Habibi, Nohooji, & Howard, 2017). 
It is also profitable to utilize the fault information obtained from FDI in manual 
maintenance approaches (H. Habibi, Howard, & Habibi, 2017) 
Generally, the aberration of system parameters from their nominal/expected 
values can be seen as faults at the system level view point (Isermann, 2006). Process, 
actuators and sensors form the main sources of faults which should be detected via the 
FDI scheme (Li, Wang, Han, & Wei, 2017). The residual-based FDI scheme is the most 
utilized one to detect the faults. In this scheme, by comparing the outputs of redundant 
identical components, either hardware or software components, the residual signal can be 
generated which contains the possible fault information. The significant deviation of the 
residual signal from zero can be translated as fault occurrence (H. Habibi, Howard, et al., 
2017). The evaluation of the residual to deduce the fault occurrence is very challenging 
especially for nonlinear systems with sensor noise, model uncertainty and immeasurable 
system disturbance (Ren, et al., 2017). In fact, these issues may lead to deviation of 
residual signal levels from zero which, in turn, leads to false FDI (Li, et al., 2017). Also, 
simple threshold checking, i.e. if the residual level crosses the threshold then the fault is 
detected, may lead to missed or non-detected faults which is very likely in the case of 
incipient/small faults which may cause severe system performance degradation or even 
instability (Blanke, Kinnaert, Lunze, Staroswiecki, & Schröder, 2006). 
Sensor failure is one of the important sources of faults which may lead to system 
performance degradation, because it is most likely that the sensor output will be used in 
feedback control design which may cause system instability or even system break down 
(Gu and Yang, 2017; H. Habibi, Howard, et al., 2017). Accordingly, detection of sensor 
faults is a significant aspect that must be considered, and various methods have been 
proposed for faster and more accurate FDI schemes. The least squares method is one of 
the best and well-developed methods to extract signal characteristics and probable fault 
information (Chen and Lu, 2013; Dalei and Mohanty, 2016; Hong and Dhupia, 2014; 
Yunlong and Peng, 2012). In (Ahmadizadeh, Zarei, & Karimi, 2014; Zarei and Shokri, 
2014), a nonlinear unknown input observer was designed for robust sensor FDI. 
Similarly, in (Aouaouda, Chadli, Shi, & Karimi, 2015), for uncertain and disturbed 
discrete-time nonlinear models, a robust observer approach for FDI was proposed. Also, 
in (H. Habibi, Howard, et al., 2017; Mehranbod, Soroush, & Panjapornpon, 2005) the 
Bayesian framework was utilized to detect and identify sensor faults. On the other hand, 
utilizing the concept of fuzziness, in (Wu and Ho, 2009), a fuzzy filter was designed for 
robust FDI of Ito stochastic systems. Two best observers, including Kalman or sliding 
mode concepts, for sensor robust FDI were studied in (Ben Brahim, Dhahri, Ben Hmida, 
& Sellami, 2017; Pourbabaee, Meskin, & Khorasani, 2016; Zhang, Swain, & Nguang, 
2015).  
The game theory, as a powerful technique in control engineering, has profited 
from many philosophical and theoretical concepts like Nash equilibrium (Chung and 
Speyer, 1998). The game theory concept is applicable in many fields, e.g. H∞ control 
(Başar and Bernhard, 2008) and optimal control (Evans, 2005). In (Chung and Speyer, 
1998; Mutuel and Speyer, 2000) the trade-off between FDI and disturbance attenuation 
has led to a game theoretic FDI filter. In (Bresolin and Capiluppi, 2013) the game theory 
concept was used to design a FDI scheme for a hybrid system which mixed continuous 
and discrete time dynamics. A discrete time FDI filter for a multiple fault case using the 
game theory concept was designed in (Murray and Speyer, 2014). In (Elhadef and Grira, 
2018) the fault diagnosis in distributed and parallel systems was studied using the game 
theory.  
In this paper, the fault model is considered as a change in coefficient of the 
regression model, as the underlying framework for sensor FDI, which can capture a wide 
variety of sensor fault types. Indeed, the change point analysis of the coefficient of the 
regression model is studied for sensor FDI. So, the change point analysis and FDI are 
used interchangeably (H. Habibi, Howard, et al., 2017). Consider the sensor measurement 
as a regression model as, 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, (1) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is sensor output, 𝛽𝑡 is sensor coefficient, and 𝜀𝑡 is independent and identically 
distributed zero mean random variables with common variance 𝜎𝜀
2 < ∞.  It is assumed 
that the 𝑥𝑡 's are unknown state variables coming from a stochastic (deterministic) state 
equation as, 
𝑥𝑡 = ℎ(𝑥𝑡−1, 𝑢𝑡) + 𝑒𝑡, (2) 
for some functions ℎ, where, 𝑢𝑡 's are control variables, for example, 𝑢𝑡 = 𝐾𝑥𝑡 which is a 
state feedback control with control gain 𝐾. Here, 𝑒𝑡 's are random error terms independent 
of 𝜀𝑡 's. In the deterministic cases, 𝑒𝑡 's are zero. As a special case, when ℎ is a linear 
function, then 𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 , where 𝛼 and 𝛾 are real numbers (H. Habibi, 
Howard, et al., 2017). The null hypothesis 𝐻0 states that there is no change in 𝛽𝑡 for 𝑡 =
1,2, … , 𝑛, while the at-most-one-change (AMOC) alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 implies that, 
there is a change at an unknown time 𝑡∗ = [𝑛𝜏∗], for 0 ≤ 𝜏∗ ≤ 1. [𝜒] represents the 
integer part of variable 𝜒. Accordingly, 𝐻1 is formulated as, 
𝐻1:  𝛽𝑡 = {
𝑏1 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡
∗,
𝑏2 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡
∗ + 1,
 (3) 
where 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are unknown sensor coefficients before and after the change moment 𝑡
∗, 
respectively, and 𝑏1 ≠ 𝑏2. The magnitude of change is 𝜑 = 𝑏2 − 𝑏1. An alternative 
choice for 𝐻1 is the epidemic change model (Ning, Pailden, & Gupta, 2012) which is 
represented as, 
𝐻1:  𝛽𝑡 = {
𝑏1 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1
∗,
𝑏2 𝑡1
∗ + 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2
∗
𝑏1 𝑡2
∗ + 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛.
, (4) 
Again, let  𝑡𝑖
∗ = [𝑛𝜏𝑖
∗], 𝑖 = 1,2, such that 0 < 𝜏1
∗ < 𝜏2
∗ < 1. Accordingly, it is 
aimed to detect changes in 𝛽𝑡. It is noteworthy that in most practical dynamic systems, in 
the fault free case 𝛽𝑡 = 1. Indeed, it is aimed to measure identically the given state. So, 
at the fault moment, after which 𝛽𝑡 ≠ 1, the sensor output is obviously not equal to the 
state. Accordingly, the fault model (3) or (4) can be translated as a multiplicative fault 
scenario. Also, the other types of faults including biased or fixed sensor output can be 
considered in this framework. For example, 𝛽𝑡 = 1 + (𝑐 − 𝜀𝑡)/𝑥𝑡 and 𝛽𝑡 = (𝑐 − 𝜀𝑡)/𝑥𝑡 
represent the biased and fixed measurement in this framework, respectively, where 𝑐 is a 
constant number. Accordingly, a family of sensor fault types can be modelled as 
multiplicative faults for which the proposed FDI scheme is applicable, which is captured 
via this framework.  
In this paper the two-way FDI approach is proposed to resolve the problem of 
weak performance of conventional one-way FDI approaches. Also, the proposed 
approach induces a game theoretic framework for change point analysis. It should be 
noted that two-way and one-way FDI approaches are accurately defined in Section 2.  The 
differences and advantages of the two-way FDI approach compared to one-way method 
can be outlined as follows in five categories. 
(a) Game theoretic arguments 
1- Game theory has different useful concepts such as equilibriums (Gibbons, 1992). Two-
player FDI makes a game theoretic framework to use all useful game theory concepts in 
FDI. For example, although, in the current paper, the Nash equilibrium is used, however, 
the widely used method IEWDS (Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategy) 
can be applied, in future researches. Also, some other famous framework in game theory 
such as different kinds of adoptions, repetitions, learning is applicable so the players can 
cover their mistakes in a cooperative framework. Different types of games like 
incomplete information (in simultaneously or sequentially form) are extendable. These 
are not applicable in one-way FDI framework.  
2- The game theory has applications in many fields of control engineering such as 𝐻∞ 
control. Two-way FDI adds some different useful concepts such as games based on bias 
reduction, player test statistic, quasi-Bayesian, their equilibriums (mixed and pure), in 
AMOC and epidemic, their limiting behaviour, the use of LMI technique, as well as the 
important topic of differential games (known-unknown states), in the current paper.  
(b) Data analysis arguments 
The proposed method here can also be used as a data mining technique (it belongs to the 
diagnosis-supervisory category of data mining techniques). So it is expected to have some 
good properties which are listed as below. 
3- Results seem to be more insensitive to outliers, missing values, and small shift 
problems, because two players may choose different detection methods that improve their 
estimation accuracy. 
4- Since two estimators are derived by two players, the ultimate change point estimation 
is a function of two estimators, for example their means. Thus, the variance of the final 
estimator is smaller than the variance of both estimators. 
5-Since the data sequence is checked for the existence of change points, it seems that the 
possibility of spurious change points being identified is decreased. 
6- The model is applicable for the use of multiple change point analysis. Indeed, as soon 
as a player detects a change point, other change points are detected sequentially by both 
players. 
7-In the epidemic change point detection, the use of only a small length of the epidemic 
period is very problematic. If one player misses and passes the period without identifying 
the change points, the other player may compensate for the first one’s mistake. 
(c) Speed of detection and performance arguments 
8- In the AMOC setting, the two-way FDI approach detects the change point faster than 
the one-way method. Indeed, it seeks for a change from both directions of the data series, 
and as soon as each player detects a change, the game is over. 
9- When the change point is close to the start or end of the data sequence, the performance 
of one-way FDI methods is often weak (Bai, 1994; Sen and Srivastava, 1975). In contrast, 
the performance of the two-way method is independent of the location of the change. 
(d) Industrial arguments 
10-The application of two-way FDI is significant when it is used for periodic maintenance 
procedures, especially for industrial systems with large amounts of data, e.g. SCADA 
data in wind turbine farms (Yang, Court, & Jiang, 2013). In fact, using this method, 
without losing any critical information, the data exploitation time can be reduced 
significantly by analysing the data from both the beginning and the end of the data series 
(Hameed, Hong, Cho, Ahn, & Song, 2009; Qiu et al., 2012). 
(e) Similarity to other detection methods 
11- Inherently, change point analysis methods use some search techniques for finding 
breaks and shifts in the parameters of statistical or mathematical models. There are many 
methods to increase the speed of the search and reduce the computational complexities. 
One of the famous methods is binary splitting with its advantages  (Ho, 1998). Two-way 
FDI is a special type of binary splitting which has some of the good properties of the 
sampling splitting method such as the rate of convergence of the search induces to two-
way FDI. 
The main contribution of the current paper compared to the available literatures 
is that the sensor FDI problem is defined as a game theoretic problem utilising the two-
way FDI approach. The existence of the Nash equilibrium is then surveyed in various 
cases with different criteria, e.g. via minimizing the bias of the player estimation of the 
sensor coefficient, before and after the fault moment, or by using the least squares 
method, the quasi-Bayesian method, and corresponding player test statistics (R. Habibi, 
Sadooghi-Alvandi, & Nematollahi, 2005). The differential game is proposed based on the 
above-mentioned test statistics and solved for known and unknown state cases. In the 
former case, the maximum principle is applied to solve the differential game, while in the 
latter one, it is solved using two approaches, including linear matrix inequality (LMI) and 
the maximum principle, when the states are estimated by the Kalman filter. The finite 
sample null distribution of the test statistic is derived when state 𝑥𝑡 is a sorted sample of 
the uniform distribution, or a linear combination of 𝑥𝑡−1 and 𝑢𝑡, or when it is estimated 
via the Kalman filtering approach. Also, using the best response function approach, the 
Nash equilibrium is derived. The Nash equilibrium is derived when both players decide 
to minimize the bias of their estimations of the parameter before and after the fault 
moment. It should be noted that, according to the best knowledge of the authors, there 
has been no attempt at studying the two-way sensor FDI, before this paper.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the game definition of 
two-way FDI is proposed. Then, using the best response function, by minimizing the bias 
of sensor coefficient estimations before and after the fault moment, made by each player 
(detector), the two-way game framework is studied. Since each player wants to test the 
null hypothesis of the no change 𝐻0 , individually, the test statistics are proposed. The 
asymptotic null distributions of test statistics are also presented. Finally, the two-way FDI 
game framework is constructed using the mentioned test statistics. In Section 3, the game 
theoretic FDI is presented for the known states case. The two-way FDI is studied for the 
AMOC and epidemic change models. The pure Nash equilibrium in three different 
perspectives and Petkov's (2013) mixed strategies are derived. A differential game is 
constructed based on these mentioned test statistics. In Section 4, the game theoretic two-
way FDI is studied for the unknown states case. First, the LMI approach is proposed. 
Then, the Kalman filter is also proposed to estimate the unknown states and also for 
solving the differential game. Illustrative examples including finite sample distributions 
of test statistics, players best response functions, sensor bias, sensor fixed output, 
epidemic faults, and rolling analysis are studied in Section 5. Also, a practical example, 
i.e. integrated servo mechanism system, is considered to evaluate the superiority of the 
proposed FDI scheme. The conclusions are given in Section 6. 
2. Game Definition and Test Statistics 
In this section the two-way game theoretic FDI framework is constructed based 
on the given criteria and corresponding test statistics are derived. 
2.1. Game Definition: Two-Way FDI 
The conventional FDI methods seek a change in 𝛽𝑡 starting at 𝑦1 and ending at 
𝑦𝑛, sequentially, using online or offline disciplines, which is called the one-way FDI, in 
this paper. Under the AMOC alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 and an offline discipline, the FDI 
problem is similar to a game between two players that aim to estimate the change point 
as well as to estimate 𝑏1, 𝑏2. In this paper, a new concept of FDI, called two-way FDI, is 
proposed which allows the use of the game theoretic methods in FDI. Consider two 
players (detectors). The player 1 moves from 𝑦1 to 𝑦𝑛 and the player 2, in a reverse 
direction, from 𝑦𝑛 to 𝑦1. Under 𝐻0, both players are greedy and rational because they 
want to use more observations in estimating 𝑏1, 𝑏2. This is the game theoretic FDI under 
𝐻0.  
To describe the game theoretic aspects under 𝐻1, consider the special case of the 
AMOC model at which 𝑥𝑡 = 1, for all 𝑡 ≥ 1. Hence, the estimations of 𝑏1 and 𝑏2, made 
by players 1 and 2 are given as ?̂?1𝑖 =
1
?̂?𝑖
∑ 𝑦𝑗
?̂?𝑖
𝑗=1  and ?̂?2𝑖 =
1
𝑛−?̂?𝑖
∑ 𝑦𝑗
𝑛−?̂?𝑖
𝑗=1 , 𝑖 = 1,2, 
respectively, where players 1 and 2 estimate 𝑡∗ by ?̂?1 and n − ?̂?2, respectively. Each player 
is trying to minimize its own estimation bias. Given ?̂?1, ?̂?2, the biases of these estimators 
are 
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠1𝑖 = {
0 ?̂?𝑖 ≤ 𝑡
∗,
𝜑(1 −
𝑡∗
?̂?𝑖
) ?̂?𝑖 ≥ 𝑡
∗ + 1,
 and  𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠2𝑖 = {
−𝜑(
𝑡∗−?̂?𝑖
𝑛−?̂?𝑖
) ?̂?𝑖 ≤ 𝑡
∗,
0 ?̂?𝑖 ≥ 𝑡
∗ + 1,
 (5) 
where, notation 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠1𝑖 stands for bias of ?̂?1𝑖. Suppose that both players compare their 
estimations of 𝑏1, given by 
1
?̂?1
∑ 𝑦𝑖
?̂?1
𝑖=1  and 
1
?̂?2
∑ 𝑦𝑖
?̂?2
𝑖=1 , respectively. Let 𝛿𝑘 = ?̂?𝑘 − 𝑡
∗, 𝑘 =
1,2. Table 1 gives the proportions of biases over 𝜑 that is the coordinates (
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠11
𝜑
,
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠12
𝜑
) 
as a function of δ1 and δ2. Cells marked by * are the pure Nash equilibrium for this game.  
Table 1. Values of (𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠11, 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠12)/𝜑 
Bias δ2 ≤ 0 δ2 > 0 
δ1 ≤ 0 (0,0)* (0,
δ2
δ2+𝑡∗
) 
δ1 > 0 (
δ1
δ1+𝑡∗
,0) (
δ1
δ1+𝑡∗
, 
δ2
δ2+𝑡∗
) 
Indeed, when max(?̂?1, ?̂?2) ≤ 𝑡
∗, the Nash equilibrium occurs. Considering the 
biases for estimation of b2, the Nash equilibrium occurs at min(?̂?1, ?̂?2) ≤ 𝑡
∗. Combining 
both Nash equilibrium conditions, it is concluded that ?̂?1 = ?̂?2 = 𝑡
∗. For another example, 
suppose that player 1 estimates 𝑏1 and player 2 estimates 𝑏2. Then, Table 2 gives the 
values of (
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠11
𝜑
,
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠22
𝜑
). The equilibrium occurs when the player 1 chooses ?̂?1 ≤ 𝑡
∗ and 
the player 2 considers the ?̂?2 ≥ 𝑡
∗ + 1.  
Table 2. Values of  (bias11, bias22)/φ 
Bias δ2 ≤ 0 δ2 > 0 
δ1 ≤ 0 (0, 
δ2
𝑛−𝑡∗−δ2
) (0,0)* 
δ1 > 0 (
δ1
δ1+𝑡∗
, 
δ2
𝑛−𝑡∗−δ2
) (
δ1
δ1+𝑡∗
, 0) 
Although, in the previous simple game, each player played his game, individually. 
However, this simple game can be modified to be a corporative/competitive game as 
follows. In the AMOC model, suppose that players 1 and 2 estimate 𝑡∗ as ?̂?1 and n − ?̂?2, 
respectively. The ultimate estimation of ?̂? is a function of ?̂?1 and ?̂?2. For example, if both 
players cooperate, then, ?̂? = 0.5(?̂?1 + ?̂?2). In a competitive two-way FDI game, it is 
assumed that as soon as one player finds a change, that player wins, and the game is 
finished. Hence, ?̂? = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(?̂?1, ?̂?2). This competition is similar to Cournot's oligopoly, 
which is frequently used in economics and finance (Gibbons, 1992). The ?̂??̂? and ?̂??̂?
∗ are 
estimations of regression coefficients before and after the change, respectively. 
Sometimes, both players agree with the same location of change. For example, in a 
sequential format of the game, both of them use the same change detector procedure. In 
these cases, a test statistic for change detection is needed. The above-mentioned example 
was a simple case of two-way FDI. The other cases are considered in Section 3. 
2.2. Players Test Statistics  
In this section test statistics are given, such that, each player can detect the change 
point individually. Also, it should be noted that, besides the bias minimization (see 
Section 2.1), game theoretic two-way FDI is constructed based on the given test statistics. 
First, assume that states 𝑥𝑡 's are known and the AMOC model is considered. The 
unknown states case is studied in Section 4. The epidemic change problem is investigated 
in Section 3.3.  When both players agree to test the existence of change at the same time 
𝑡, (𝑡 ≤ 𝑛 − 1) the least square estimates of parameters (regression coefficients) before 
and after the change is given by 
?̂?𝑡 =
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑡
𝑖=1
 , ?̂?𝑡
∗ =
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑡+1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=𝑡+1
 .                     (6) 
Let 𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑡
𝑖=1  and 𝜆𝑡 =
𝑠𝑡
𝑠𝑛
, 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, and suppose that  
𝑑𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗,                     (7) 
where  
?̂?𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡?̂?𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡)(
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
). (8) 
When the 𝐻0 is correct, i.e. there is no change, then 𝑑𝑡 oscillates around zero for 
each of the 𝑡's and if for some 𝑡∗ the |𝑑𝑡∗| is too large, it indicates that there is a change 
at 𝑡∗. This fact motivates one to use the following suitable test statistic 
𝑚𝑎𝑥2≤𝑡≤𝑛−1|𝑑𝑡|, (9) 
as a change detector. To standardize 𝑑𝑡, it is easily can be seen that   
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑑𝑡) =
𝜎𝜀
2
𝑠𝑛𝜆𝑡(1−𝜆𝑡)
. (10) 
Therefore, the standardized 𝑑𝑡 is proportional to √𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝑡)|𝑑𝑡|. Hence, the test statistic 
is given by,  
𝑚𝑎𝑥2≤𝑡≤𝑛−1√𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝑡)|𝑑𝑡|. (11) 
Using some algebraic manipulations, it can be seen that ?̂?𝑡
∗ =
?̂?𝑛−𝜆𝑡?̂?𝑡
1−𝜆𝑡
 and 𝑑𝑡 =
?̂?𝑛−?̂?𝑡
1−𝜆𝑡
. 
Thus, the test statistic (11) is modified as, 
𝑚𝑎𝑥2≤𝑡≤𝑛−1|𝑢𝑡
𝑛|, (12) 
where, 𝑢𝑡
𝑛 = √𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
−1(?̂?
𝑡
− ?̂?
𝑛
). The estimation of change point 𝑡∗ is then given by, 
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥2≤𝑡≤𝑛−1|𝑢𝑡
𝑛|. (13) 
Assuming the change point 𝑡∗ is bounded from the start or end of the data sequence, i.e., 
𝑡∗ ∈ 𝐼 = [𝑎, 𝑏] where 𝑎 = [𝑛𝜃] and 𝑏 = [𝑛(1 − 𝜃)] for some positive small number 𝜃, 
then, each player test statistic is given by,  
𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡∈𝐼|𝑢𝑡
𝑛|. (14) 
The 𝑢𝑡
𝑛 plot is close to zero when there is no change in 𝛽𝑡. When there is a sudden change 
in 𝛽𝑡 's, the |𝑢𝑡
𝑛| plot shows a pattern going out from some specified boundaries with high 
probability (see Section 5.1). The mentioned boundaries are obtained using the 
asymptotic or finite sample distributions of test statistics (see Sections 2.3 and 5.1 part 
(a)).  
To illustrate that |𝑢𝑡
𝑛| takes its maximum at the actual change point, a simple 
example is given in the AMOC setting, as 𝑛 = 1000 and 𝑡∗ = 500, 𝑏1 = 2, 𝑏2 = 3, 𝜎𝜀 =
0.5 and 𝑥𝑡 's are the sorted sequence of  𝑛  independent and uniformly distributed variables 
on (0,1). Then, the resulting plot of |𝑢𝑡
𝑛| is shown in Figure 1. It is obvious that the 
maximum point is at the change point and crosses the boundary 0.25. This boundary is 
calculated with Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 repetitions, and the empirical 95% 
quantile is considered as the boundary. 
To apply this test procedure in the epidemic change model, it is necessary to find 
the first change and then apply the test procedure for observations after the first change 
to find the next change time point. An alternative method is to apply the two-way method 
based on the game theory approach which is described in Section 3.3.  
When the 𝒙𝑡 and 𝜷𝑡 are vectors (in bolded notations) of size 𝑝 ≥ 2, the regression 
equation is 𝑦𝑡 = 𝒙𝑡
′𝜷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 . The ?̂?𝑡 is given by (∑ 𝒙𝑖
′𝒙𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 )
−1∑ 𝒙𝑖
′𝒚𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 . Then, the test 
statistic is given by 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡∈𝐼(𝜷𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗)
′
𝛬−1(𝜷𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗), where 𝛬 = (∑ 𝒙𝑖
′𝒙𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 )
−1 +
(∑ 𝒙𝑖
′𝒙𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑡+1 )
−1. It is easy to see that for the case of 𝑝 = 1, the above equation reduces 
to the 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1  and in the current paper, this case is enough for the proposed analysis.  
Hereafter, the two-way FDI is constructed using test statistics. To this end, notice 
that, if each player wants to detect the change individually, independently, and they use 
𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1  in the offline discipline, then both estimate the change point as ?̂?1 = ?̂?2. However, if 
player 1 assumes that player 2 believes that the location of change is 𝑠, then the test 
statistic 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1  is given as the maximum value of |𝑢min (𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛 | over 𝑡 ∈ 𝐼 given that 𝑠 is kept 
fixed, i.e., 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡∈𝐼|𝑢min(𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛 |. The best response of player 1 (player 2), when player 
2 (player 1) believes that the change is fixed at 𝑠 (𝑡), is given by 𝐵1(𝑠) = ?̂?𝑠 =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡|𝑢min (𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛 | (or 𝐵2(𝑡) = ?̂?𝑡 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠|𝑢min (𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛 |), where 𝐵1(𝑠) (𝐵2(𝑡)) is the 
best response of player 1 (player 2) when player 2 (player 1) believes that the change 
point is 𝑠 (𝑡). To illustrate that Nash equilibrium occurs at the actual change point, 
consider the time series plots of ?̂?𝑠 and ?̂?𝑡, as given in Figure 2, for a simple example as 
follows. 𝑛 = 100, 𝑡∗ = 20, 𝑏1 = 1, 𝑏2 = 5, 𝜎𝜀 = 0.1 and 𝑥𝑡 's come from 𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 +
𝛾𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, and 𝑢𝑡 = 𝐾𝑥𝑡, with 𝛼 = 0.1, 𝛾 = 0.5 and 𝐾 = 0.2. As it is obvious that a Nash 
equilibrium occurs at 𝑡 = 𝑠 = 20. As it is seen, 𝑠 = 𝑡 = 20 is the first 𝜏 at which 
𝐵1(𝐵2(𝜏)) = 𝜏 and 𝐵2(𝐵1(𝜏)) = 𝜏 occurs as well as where utilities (payoffs) are 
maximized. Thus, a stable Nash equilibrium occurs at 𝑡 = 𝑠 = 20 (Gibbons, 1992). It 
should be noted that this scheme will be also investigated carefully in Section 5.2 with 
payoff function 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛 0.5(𝑡+𝑠)
𝑛 . 
As follows, theoretical arguments of the simulated results shown in Figure 2 are 
given. Notice that the test statistic of the player 1 is given by, 
𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡∈𝐼|𝑢min(𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛 | = max(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡<𝑠|𝑢t
𝑛|, |𝑢𝑠
𝑛|),               (15) 
where 𝑠 is the player 1’s belief about the player 2’s belief of change location. Then the 
change time point estimation is given by, 
?̂?𝑠 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡{max(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡<𝑠|𝑢t
𝑛|, |𝑢𝑠
𝑛|)}.                     (16) 
Also, the test statistic of the player 2 is, 
𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2 = max(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠<𝑡|𝑢s
𝑛|, |𝑢𝑡
𝑛|). (17) 
For both players the 𝑢min (𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛  is very close to its expectation (for similar arguments see 
(Bai, 1994)), and since its expectation is maximized at 𝑡∗ then 
{
min(?̂?𝑠, 𝑠) = 𝑡
∗,
min(?̂?𝑡 , 𝑡) = 𝑡
∗.
 (18) 
Thus, it is concluded that the Nash equilibrium is 𝑠 = 𝑡 = 𝑡∗ which shows that both 
players select the actual change point, correctly. A natural question is about the best 
combination of ?̂?1, ?̂?2 to find the ultimate estimation of ?̂?. To answer this question, when 
both players use the criterion |𝑢0.5(𝑡+𝑠)
𝑛 |, again it is seen that  
{
?̂?𝑠 + 𝑠 = 2𝑡
∗,
?̂?𝑡 + 𝑡 = 2𝑡
∗.
 (19) 
A solution in this case is 𝑠 = 𝑡 = 𝑡∗. Again, both players select the actual change point.  
Here, an alternative formulation of the test statistic and Nash equilibrium are 
presented. Following (R. Habibi, et al., 2005; Kander and Zacks, 1966) the quasi-
Bayesian method test statistic is given by 
𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2 = ∫ 𝜋𝑠|𝑢[𝑛𝑠]
𝑛 |𝑑𝑠
1−𝜃
𝜃
,  (20) 
for some weighting function 𝜋𝑠. The above test statistic may be considered as a weighted 
average of 𝑢𝑡
𝑛. Indeed, the integral functional is used in 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2  instead of maximum 
functional which used in 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 . The large values of the test statistic reject the null 
hypothesis 𝐻0 . Thus, the null hypothesis of 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2  is needed to find the threshold 𝑐 such 
that 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2 > 𝑐 rejects the null hypothesis 𝐻0 . This method for change point detection in a 
general class of distributions has been applied in (R. Habibi, et al., 2005). Again, using 
criterion 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛  in 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2 , it is seen that the test statistic of the player 1 is given by  
∫ 𝜋𝑡|𝑢[𝑛𝑡]
𝑛 |𝑑𝑡 +
𝑠
𝜃
|𝑢[𝑛𝑠]
𝑛 | ∫ 𝜋𝑡
1−𝜃
𝑠
𝑑𝑡,  (21) 
whereas the test statistic for the player 2 is 
∫ 𝜋𝑠|𝑢[𝑛𝑠]
𝑛 |𝑑𝑠 +
𝑡
𝜃
|𝑢[𝑛𝑡]
𝑛 | ∫ 𝜋𝑠
1−𝜃
𝑡
𝑑𝑠.  (22) 
If 𝑢[𝑛𝑡]
𝑛  and 𝑢[𝑛𝑠]
𝑛  are replaced by 𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛  in (21) and (22), via considering the best 
response functions of both players, which maximize (21) and (22), it is easy to see that 
again the Nash equilibrium occurs at 𝑡∗.  
2.3. Asymptotic Null Distributions 
To make statistical inference about the existence of the change, as well as to find 
the boundaries mentioned in the previous Section, the asymptotic (limiting) null 
distributions of 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2 are needed. First, notice that under the null hypothesis 𝐻0 , 
𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽 for 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛. Thus, |?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛| = |?̂?𝑡 − 𝛽 − (?̂?𝑛 − 𝛽)|. That is, the null 
distribution of  𝑇𝑛,𝜃
𝑖  doesn't depend on 𝛽. So, it is assumed that 𝛽 = 0. Also, notice that, 
based on the 𝑥𝑡 's being either deterministic or a stochastic sequence of numbers, the 
asymptotic null distributions differs. For example, in the 𝑥𝑡 deterministic case, assuming, 
for each 𝑢, then  
𝑛−1∑ 𝑥𝑖
2[𝑛𝑢]
𝑖=1 → 𝑔(𝑢),                (23) 
then Proposition 1 gives the null limiting distribution of 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 . Let 𝐻(𝑢) = 𝑊(𝑔(𝑢)) −
𝑔(𝑢)
𝑔(1)
𝑊(𝑔(1)) and 𝐺(𝑢) = {𝑔(𝑢)(1 − 𝑔(𝑢))}
−0.5
𝐻(𝑔(𝑢)), where 𝑊 is the standard 
Brownian motion on [0,1].  
Proposition 1. Under 𝐻0,  the limiting null distribution of 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1  is given as follows, 
𝑛−
3
2𝜎−1𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 →𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢∈[𝜃,1−𝜃]𝐺(𝑢).               (24) 
Notation →𝑑 stands for the convergence in the distribution.                                                     
Proof. Using the Donsker theorem, (see, Billingsley, 2013), it is seen that 
𝑛−1/2𝜎−1∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜀𝑖 ⇝𝑊(𝑔(𝑢))
[𝑛𝑢]
𝑖=1 . Here, the weak convergence ⇝ occurs on the space 
𝐷[0,1] on the Skorokhod topology. The 𝐷[0,1] is space of all functions that have limits 
to the left at each 𝑡 ∈ (0,1] and are right-continuous functions. The Skorokhod topology 
is an alternative version of uniform topology (Billingsley, 2013). Also, notice that, 
𝜎−1
𝑛√𝑛
|?̂?[𝑛𝑢] − ?̂?𝑛| =
𝑠[𝑛𝑢]
𝑛
(
𝜎−1
√𝑛
| ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜀𝑖 −
𝑠[𝑛𝑢]
𝑠𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜀𝑖|)
𝑛
𝑖=1
[𝑛𝑢]
𝑖=1 ⇝ 𝑔(𝑢)|𝐻(𝑢)|. Hence, 
𝑛−
3
2𝜎−1𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 →𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢∈[𝜃,1−𝜃]𝐺(𝑢). This completes the proof.      ■ 
Corollary 1. (a)-(c) are true.   
(a) If 𝑔(𝑢) = 𝑢, then process 𝐻(𝑢) is a standard Brownian bridge of 𝑊(𝑢) on [0,1]. 
(b) In case of (a) and under 𝐻0, assuming |
𝛼
1−𝛾𝐾
| < 1, then 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1  converges in distribution 
to the maximum of the Bessel process 
𝑊(𝑢)−𝑢𝑊(1)
√𝑢(1−𝑢)
 (see (Bai, 1994)).  
(c) If 𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 , with the feedback control variable 𝑢𝑡 = 𝐾𝑥𝑡 , which is a 
frequently used state equation in control engineering, again the deterministic results are 
true. 
Proof. The proof of part (a) is straightforward and then omitted. For the part (b), notice 
that, 𝑥𝑡 =
𝛼
1−𝛾𝐾
𝑥𝑡−1 +
1
𝛼
𝑒𝑡, and this completes the proof part (b). The statistical 
properties of the Bessel process have been studied in (Revuz and Yor, 1999). The proof 
of part (c) is also straightforward. Here, using a Monte Carlo simulation, the quantiles of 
a Bessel process is simulated and consequently the boundaries mentioned in the previous 
section are derived.                                                                                             ■ 
The following proposition gives the limiting distribution of 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 , when condition 
|
𝛼
1−𝛾𝐾
| < 1 is violated which is necessary for the proposition 1. To this end, suppose that 
𝛼 = 1 − 𝛾𝐾 and 𝑊∗and 𝑊 are two independent standard Brownian motions. Let 
𝐺∗(𝑢) =
𝑋(𝑢)−
∆𝑢
∆1
𝑋(1)
√∆𝑢(1−∆𝑢)
 with 𝑋(𝑢) = ∫ 𝑊∗(𝑠)𝑑𝑊(𝑠)
𝑢
0
 and ∆𝑢=
∫ 𝑊∗2(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑢
0
∫ 𝑊∗2(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
1
0
. 
Proposition 2. Under the null hypothesis 𝐻0, and if 𝛼 = 1 − 𝛾𝐾, then 
𝑛−
3
2𝜎−1𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 →𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢∈[𝜃,1−𝜃]𝐺
∗(𝑢)/𝛼. (25) 
Proof. As 𝛼 = 1 − 𝛾𝐾, then sequence 𝑥𝑡
′𝑠 have unit root and they are random walk, 
indeed, 𝑥𝑖 = ∑
𝑒𝑗
𝛼
𝑖
𝑗=1 . Assuming 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽 = 0, then ?̂?[𝑛𝑢] =
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜀𝑖
[𝑛𝑢]
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2[𝑛𝑢]
𝑖=1
 which converges 
weakly (as a stochastic process) to 
1
𝛼
∫ 𝑊∗(𝑠)𝑑𝑊(𝑠)
𝑢
0
∫ 𝑊∗2(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑢
0
. Thus, 
𝑛−
3
2𝜎−1𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 →𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢∈[𝜃,1−𝜃]𝐺
∗(𝑢)/𝛼. This completes the proof.                                  ■ 
Proposition 3. Under 𝐻0, then  
𝑛−
3
2𝜎−1𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2 → ∫ 𝜋𝑠
|𝐵(𝑠)|
√𝑠(1−𝑠)
1−𝜃
𝜃
𝑑𝑠.          (26) 
Proof. The continuous mapping theorem (Billingsley, 2013) and convergence of 
𝑛−1/2𝜎−1∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜀𝑖
[𝑛𝑢]
𝑖=1  completes the proof.  The Monte Carlo method may be applied to 
find the quantiles of ∫ 𝜋𝑠
|𝐵(𝑠)|
√𝑠(1−𝑠)
1−𝜀
𝜀
𝑑𝑠.                                                                            ■ 
3. Two-Way FDI: Known States 
In the previous section, the two-way FDI was constructed via test statistics of 
change point analysis. In this Section, it is assumed that states 𝑥𝑡 's are known. This 
assumption leads to finding the pure and mixture Nash equilibriums, appropriately. Also, 
it makes a framework to study the differential games and more complicated structures 
such as epidemic faults. The results can be extended to the unknown state cases which 
are studied in Section 4. 
Assume that 𝑥𝑡 's are known. Without loss of generality, assume that 𝑥𝑡 = 1, for 
all 𝑡 ≥ 1.  To elaborate the reason, suppose that 𝑥𝑡 ≠ 1 for some 𝑡's. The states of the 
following scaled regression model are one 
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
= 𝛽𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡
𝑥𝑡
, 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛. (27) 
An interesting point is that the variance of variable 
𝜀𝑡
𝑥𝑡
 is 
𝜎2
𝑥𝑡
2 which causes a 
heteroskedasticity property in the regression model (27). The weighted mean of 
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
  (using 
𝑥𝑡
2
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 as generalized least square weights) is exactly the ?̂?𝑡 . This fact shows that 
inferences based on both models (27) and (1) are equivalent. Hence, originally, assume 
that 𝑥𝑡 = 1, for all 𝑡 ≥ 1, that is,  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑛. (28) 
In model (28), 𝛽𝑡 is the mean of 𝑦𝑡. Therefore, the cumulative sum (CUMSUM) 
approach can be applied for FDI. Using this new approach, as follows, the two-way pure 
and mixed Nash equilibriums are derived in the AMOC case. The differential games are 
studied and two-way FDI is studied for epidemic hypothesis.  
3.1. Pure Equilibrium 
Here, for the AMOC case, the pure Nash equilibrium is studied in three different 
perspectives (a)-(c), as follows. First, notice that the 𝑖-th player (𝑖 = 1,2),  estimates the 
change 𝜏𝑖  ∈ (0,1) (instead of ?̂?𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 − 1) by optimizing the objective (utility) 
functions 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2 where,   
𝑢1(𝜏1) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?),
[𝑛𝜏1]
𝑖=1 𝑢2(𝜏2) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑛−𝑖+1 − ?̅?).
𝑛−[𝑛𝜏2]
𝑖=1                 (29) 
 (a) Suppose that player 1 estimates 𝑏1 by  ?̅?[𝑛𝜏1] =
1
[𝑛𝜏1]
∑ 𝑦𝑖
[𝑛𝜏1]
𝑖=1  and player 2 
estimates 𝑏2 by ?̅?[𝑛𝜏2]
∗ =
1
𝑛−[𝑛𝜏1]
∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛−[𝑛𝜏2]
𝑖=1 . Without loss of generality, assume that 𝜑 ≥
0. To test 𝐻0: 𝑏1 = 𝑏2, the test statistic is ?̅?[𝑛𝜏1] − ?̅?[𝑛𝜏2]
∗ . Similar to arguments in Section 
2.1, it is seen that to reduce the biases of estimations of ?̅?[𝑛𝜏1] and ?̅?[𝑛𝜏2]
∗  as well as the 
bias of the test statistic ?̅?[𝑛𝜏1] − ?̅?[𝑛𝜏2]
∗ , it is enough to let 𝜏1 = 𝜏2 = 𝜏
∗.  Thus, the Nash 
equilibrium occurs at the actual change point 𝜏∗.  
 (b) Similar to Section 2.2, suppose that the ultimate estimation of the change is 
𝜏 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜏1, 𝜏2). Then, the best response of the 𝑖-th (𝑖 = 1,2)  player is given by 
{
𝐵1(τ2) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥0≤𝜏1≤1|𝑢1(𝜏)|,
𝐵2(τ1) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥0≤𝜏2≤1|𝑢2(𝜏)|.
 (30) 
One can see that 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 are very close to their means (Bai, 1994). Therefore,  
𝑢1(𝜏) ≈ 𝐸(𝑢1(𝜏)) = {
−𝜑(1 − 𝜏∗)𝜏 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏∗,
−𝜑𝜏∗(1 − 𝜏) 𝜏 > 𝜏∗,
          (31) 
and 𝑢2(𝜏) = −𝑢1(𝜏). Also, notice that  
𝑢1(𝜏) = 𝑢1(𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜏1, 𝜏2)) = {
𝑢1(𝜏1) 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏2,
𝑢1(𝜏2) 𝜏1 > 𝜏2.
          (32) 
Here, 𝐵1(𝜏2) and 𝐵2(𝜏1) are found as follows. If 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏2 and 𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏
∗, then 𝐵1(𝜏2) = 𝜏2. 
If 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏2 and 𝜏2 > 𝜏
∗, then 𝐵1(𝜏2) = 𝜏
∗. Therefore, when 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏2, then 𝐵1(𝜏2) =
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜏2, 𝜏
∗). If τ1 > τ2, then 𝐵1(𝜏2) = [𝜏2, 1]. In the current case, if 𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏
∗, again 
𝐵1(𝜏2) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜏2, 𝜏
∗). Hence, consider the case of 𝜏1 > 𝜏2 and 𝜏2 > 𝜏
∗, again, it is easy 
to see that 𝑢1(𝜏2) < 𝑢1(𝜏
∗), thus, for all cases, 
𝐵1(𝜏2) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜏2, 𝜏
∗). (33) 
Also, it can be seen that 𝐵1(𝜏) = 𝐵2(𝜏). Therefore, a Nash equilibrium occurs at 𝜏
∗. 
(c) Again, assume that the ultimate estimation of the change is the minimum of 
change estimations of player 1 and player 2. Also, a version of rationality (additional to 
the regular rationality assumption the usually exists in game theoretic problems) is 
assumed for both players. Suppose that if players 1 and 2 understand that player 1’s 
estimate of change is closer to the actual change than the change estimation of player 2, 
then they use 𝑢2, instead of 𝑢1, and vice versa. Then, following (Petkov, 2013), it is seen 
that this game doesn't have pure equilibrium. 
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion. 
Proposition 4. The actual change point 𝜏∗ is the pure Nash equilibrium of the two-way 
game under perspectives (a) and (b). Under (c), the pure Nash equilibrium does not exist. 
3.2. Mixed Equilibrium 
Consider the part (c) of Section 3.1. Since, the pure Nash equilibrium doesn't exist, 
it is interested to find the mixed Nash equilibrium. To this end, assume that both players 
randomize according to a distribution function 𝐹. Let the ultimate change point be 
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜏1, 𝜏2), where 𝜏1, 𝜏2 are player 1 and player 2 estimates of change point 𝑡
∗.  Similar 
to part (c) of the previous Section, players 1 and 2 are rational. Then, following (Petkov, 
2013), the expected payoff of player 1 (𝑝𝑎𝑦1) is  
𝑝𝑎𝑦1 = ∫ 𝑢(𝜏)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) =
1
0
∫ 𝑢(
𝜏1
0
𝜏2)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) + ∫ 𝑢(
1
𝜏1
𝜏1)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) = ∫ 𝑢2(
𝜏1
0
𝜏2)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) +
∫ 𝑢1(
1
𝜏1
𝜏1)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) = ∫ 𝑢2(
𝜏1
0
𝜏2)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) + (1 − 𝐹(𝜏1))𝑢1(𝜏1).                 (34) 
The mixed strategy is to choose 𝐹 such that 
𝜕𝑝𝑎𝑦1
𝜕𝜏1
= 0, see (Gibbons, 1992). In 
this way, player 1 is indifferent for any 𝜏1 ∈ [0,1]. By differentiating with respect to 𝜏1 
and using the Leibnitz rule, see (Billingsley, 2013), it is seen that, 
−𝐹′(𝜏1)
1−𝐹(𝜏1)
=
𝑢1
′ (𝜏1)
𝑢2(𝜏1)−𝑢1(𝜏1)
∶= ℎ(𝜏1),   𝜏 ∈ [0,1].                  (35) 
One can see that,  
ℎ(𝜏1) = {
0.5𝜏1
−1, 0 < 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏
∗,
0.5(1 − 𝜏1)
−1, 𝜏∗ ≤ 𝜏1 < 1.
                         (36) 
Thus, the distribution function is derived as  
𝐹(𝜏1) = 1 − 𝑒
−𝐻(𝜏1) and 𝐻(𝜏1) = ∫ ℎ(𝑠)𝑑𝑠.
𝜏1
0
               (37) 
To make sure that Equation (37) is a proper integral, lower bounds 0 and 1 are 
replaced by 𝜃 and (1 − 𝜃), respectively, for some positive small number 𝜃 > 0. To 
numerically show that 𝐹(𝜏1) is well defined, let 𝜏
∗ = 0.25, and 𝜃 = 0.01. Then,  
ℎ(𝜏1) = {
0.5𝜏1
−1, 0.01 < 𝜏1 ≤ 0.25,
0.5(1 − 𝜏1)
−1, 0.25 ≤ 𝜏1 < 0.99.
                  (38) 
Then, the survive function 1 − 𝐹(𝜏) is given by, 
1 − 𝐹(𝜏) = {
0.1𝜏−0.5, 0.01 < 𝜏 ≤ 0.25,
0.2309√1 − 𝜏, 0.25 < 𝜏 ≤ 0.99.
                  (39) 
The density of mixture cumulative distribution function (Mix-CDF) 𝐹(𝜏) is given by,  
𝑓(𝜏) = {
0.05𝜏−1.5, 0.01 < 𝜏 ≤ 0.25,
0.2309(1 − 𝜏)−0.5, 0.25 < 𝜏 ≤ 0.99.
                  (40) 
𝐹(𝜏) and related density (Mix-Dens), i.e. 𝑓(𝜏), are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 Alternatively, suppose that the ultimate estimation of the change is given by the mean of 
𝜏1 and 𝜏2. Hence, the expected payoff in this case is given by, 
𝑝𝑎𝑦1
∗ = ∫ 𝑢(
𝜏1+𝜏2
2
1
0
)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) = ∫ 𝑢2(
𝜏1+𝜏2
2
𝜏1
0
)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) + ∫ 𝑢1(
𝜏1+𝜏2
2
1
𝜏1
)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) =
∫ 𝑢2(
𝜏1+𝜏2
2
𝜏1
0
)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) + ∫ 𝑢1(
𝜏1+𝜏2
2
1
𝜏1
)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2).                  (41) 
Let  
𝜕𝑝𝑎𝑦1
∗
𝜕𝜏1
= 0. Then, it is seen that  
𝐹′(𝜏1){𝑢2(𝜏1) − 𝑢1(𝜏1)} + 𝐼 + 𝐼𝐼 = 0.                  (42) 
where, 𝐼 =
1
2
∫ 𝑢2
′ (
𝜏1+𝜏2
2
𝜏1
0
)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) = ∫ 𝑢2
′ (𝑦
𝜏1
𝜏1
2
)𝐹′(2𝑦 − 𝜏1)𝑑𝑦, 𝐼𝐼 =
1
2
∫ 𝑢1
′ (
𝜏1+𝜏2
2
1
𝜏1
)𝑑𝐹(𝜏2) = ∫ 𝑢1
′ (𝑦
1+𝜏1
2
𝜏1
)𝐹′(2𝑦 − 𝜏1)𝑑𝑦, and  y =
τ1+τ2
2
. It is easy to see that  
                   𝐼 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝜑(1−𝜏∗)𝐹(𝜏1)
2
, 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏
∗,
𝜑𝐹(2𝜏∗−𝜏1)
2
−
𝜑𝜏∗𝐹(𝜏1)
2
, 𝜏∗ < 𝜏1 ≤ 2𝜏
∗
−𝜑𝜏∗𝐹(𝜏1)
2
, 𝜏1 > 2𝜏
∗,
, 
                 𝐼𝐼 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝜑𝜏∗
2
−
−𝜑(1−𝜏∗)(1−𝐹(𝜏1))
2
, 𝜏1 ≤ 2𝜏
∗ − 1,
𝜑𝐹(2𝜏∗−𝜏1)
2
+
𝜑(1−𝜏∗)𝐹(𝜏1)
2
, 2𝜏∗ − 1 < 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏
∗,
𝜑𝜏∗(1−𝐹(𝜏1))
2
, 𝜏1 > 𝜏
∗.
   (43) 
Again, a differential equation is derived for 𝐹. Solving this equation, 𝐹 is derived. 
Proposition 5. The mixed Nash equilibrium distribution function 𝐹 is given by 
(a) When the ultimate change point is 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝜏1, 𝜏2), then  
𝐹(𝜏1) = 1 − 𝑒
−𝐻(𝜏1), 𝐻(𝜏1) = ∫ ℎ(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝜏1
0
,        (44) 
where ℎ(𝜏1) = {
0.5𝜏1
−1, 0 < 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏
∗,
0.5(1 − 𝜏1)
−1, 𝜏∗ ≤ 𝜏1 < 1.
 
(b) When the ultimate change point is 0.5(𝜏1 + 𝜏2), then F satisfies (42). 
3.3. Differential Game 
Under AMOC hypothesis, a differential game (Bressan, 2010) is proposed based 
on 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2 . It is solved using the Pontryagin maximum principle and its Nash equilibrium is 
derived. Consider 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2  and let the magnitude of change be positive, i.e., 𝜑 > 0. Define 
the process 𝑇𝑠 as follows  
𝑇𝑠 = ∫ 𝜋𝑥𝑢[𝑛𝑥]
𝑛 𝑑𝑥,
𝑠
0
             (45) 
where 𝑢𝑡
𝑛 = √𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝑡)(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗), where ?̂?𝑡 and ?̂?𝑡
∗ are computed by players 1 and 2, 
respectively. The Mayer type differential game is as (Bressan, 2010), 
{
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐽 = 𝑇1 ,
𝑇𝑠
′ = 𝜋𝑠𝑢[𝑛𝑠].
𝑛               (46) 
where 𝑇𝑠
′ is derivative of 𝑇𝑠 with respect to 𝑠. The Hamiltonian function 𝐻𝑠 using co-state 
variable 𝑝𝑠 is given by,  
𝐻 = 𝐻𝑠 = −𝑝𝑠𝜋𝑠𝑢[𝑛𝑠]
𝑛 .            (47) 
It is seen that 𝜕𝐻/𝜕𝑇𝑠 = 𝑝𝑠
′ = 0 which shows that 𝑝𝑠 is a constant. Since 𝜕𝑇1/𝜕𝑇1 =
𝑝1 = 1, then 𝑝𝑠 = 1 for all 𝑠. Also, using Bang-Bang control (Isermann, 2006), it is seen 
that, 
𝜋𝑠 = {
1 if 𝑢[𝑛𝑠]
𝑛 > 0,
0 otherwise,
= {
1 if ?̂?[𝑛𝑠] > ?̂?[𝑛𝑠]
∗ ,
0 otherwise.
            (48) 
An equivalent form for 𝜋𝑠 is given by,  
𝜋𝑠 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 ?̂?[𝑛𝑠] − ?̂?𝑛 > 𝑐,
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
            (49) 
where 𝑐 denotes a constant number. To find 𝑐, under 𝐻0, let 𝑃(?̂?[𝑛𝑠] − ?̂?𝑛 > 𝑐) = 𝛼, for 
some predetermined significant level 1 −  𝛼. As 𝑛 → ∞, using asymptotic distributions 
in Section 2.3, with 𝑔(𝑢) = 𝑢, then ?̂?[𝑛𝑠] − ?̂?𝑛 ⇝
𝑊(𝑠)−𝑠𝑊(1)
𝑠
~𝑁(0,
1−𝑠
𝑠
). Thus, 𝑐 =
𝑧𝛼√
1−𝑠
𝑠
, where 𝑧𝛼 is (1 − 𝛼)-th quantile of standard normal distribution. An alternative 
of 𝑐 is zero, since under 𝐻0, then 𝐸(?̂?[𝑛𝑠] − ?̂?𝑛) = 0. Let 𝑡∗ = inf {𝑡, ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗ > 0}. Since 
?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗ is too close to its expectation (Bai, 1994), then 𝑡∗ = inf {𝑡, 𝐸(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗) > 0}. 
First assume that 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡∗. Then,  
𝐸(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
∗) =
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=𝑡∗+1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=𝑡+1
𝜑 > 0,            (50) 
which is maximized at 𝑡∗. This fact leads to 𝑡∗ = 𝑡
∗. Indeed, at 𝑡 = 𝑡∗ no player is willing 
to change its strategy (to choose another point as a change point). This shows that the 
Nash equilibrium happens at 𝑡 = 𝑡∗. The same result is also obtained when 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡∗ is 
considered. 
Proposition 6. Considering the process 𝑇𝑠 as (45), the differential game solution is given 
by (49). 
Now to illustrate the differential game approach, two simple examples for 
uniformly distributed random states and first order state feedback system are studied.  
(a) For 𝑛 = 1000, 𝑡∗ = 200, 𝑏1 = 1, 𝑏2 = 5, 𝜎𝜀 = 0.1 and 𝑥𝑡 's are the sorted sequence 
of  𝑛  independent and uniformly distributed variables on (0,1), the time series plot of 
?̂?[𝑛𝑠] − ?̂?𝑛  is shown in Figure 4.  
(b) Let 𝑛 = 1000, 𝑡∗ = 200, 𝑏1 = 1, 𝑏2 = 5, 𝜎𝜀 = 0.1 and 𝑥𝑡 's come from correlated 
states 𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, and 𝑢𝑡 = 𝐾𝑥𝑡, with 𝛼 = 0.1, 𝛾 = 0.5 and 𝐾 = 0.2, then, 
the time series plot of ?̂?[𝑛𝑠] − ?̂?𝑛  is shown in Figure 5.  
In the unknown states cases, 𝑥𝑡 's are estimated by the Kalman filter and, 
accordingly, the differential game is presented in Section 4.2.  
3.4. Epidemic Game 
The epidemic change point is a special case of multiple change point model where 
𝛽𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖 for 𝑡𝑖
∗ + 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑖+1
∗  with 𝑖 = 0,… , 𝑅 − 1, 𝑡0
∗ = 0, where 𝑅 denotes the number 
of change points. In the epidemic case, 𝑅 is kept fixed at 2. The regular way to detect 
change points 𝑡𝑖
∗, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑅 − 1, is first to estimate 𝑅 and then estimating 𝑡𝑅−1
∗  and to 
move backward to 𝑡1
∗. Here, the two-way game theoretic solution to the epidemic change 
problem is proposed. Consider (1). Since, 𝛽𝑡 plays the role of the mean of 𝑦𝑡, to detect 
two change points, two CUMSUM partial sum processes 𝑢𝑛
1(𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) and 𝑢𝑛
2(𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) 
are as follows  
{
𝑢𝑛
1(𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?[𝑛𝜏2])
[𝑛𝜏1]
𝑖=1 ,
𝑢𝑛
2(𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑛−𝑖+1 − ?̅?[𝑛𝜏1]
∗ ),
[𝑛𝜏2]
𝑖=1
               (51) 
for 0 < 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏2 < 1. Here, ?̅?[𝑛𝜏1]
∗  is the mean of 𝑦𝑛−𝑖+1, 𝑖 = 1,2,… , [𝑛𝜏1]. While 
detection of 𝜏1, given that 𝜏2 is known, the stochastic process |𝑢𝑛
1(𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2)| is maximized 
by player 1 and for detecting of 𝜏2, given 𝜏1, the process |𝑢𝑛
2(𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2)| is maximized by 
player 2. This problem defines a stochastic dynamic game for two players with payoff 
functions |𝑢𝑛
𝑖 (𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2)|, 𝑖 = 1,2, respectively.  
As follows, the Nash equilibrium of the two-way game is found. First notice that 
𝑢𝑛
𝑖 (𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) behaves such that its mean 𝜇𝑛
𝑖 (𝜏1, 𝜏2) ≈ 𝐸(𝑢𝑛
𝑖 (𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2)). To see this, notice 
that, 
𝑢𝑛
𝑖 (𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) = 𝜇𝑛
𝑖 (𝜏1, 𝜏2) + 𝑢𝑛
𝑖 (𝜀, 𝜏1, 𝜏2), 𝑖 = 1,2.               (52) 
Then, as 𝑛 → ∞, using the Donsker theorem (Billingsley, 2013), it is seen that,  
{
𝑛1/2𝑢𝑛
1(𝜀, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) ⇝ 𝑊(𝜏1) −
𝜏1
𝜏2
𝑊(𝜏2),
𝑛1/2𝑢𝑛
2(𝜀, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) ⇝ 𝑊
∗(𝜏2) −
𝜏2
1−𝜏1
𝑊∗(𝜏1).
               (53) 
Here, notation 𝑊(𝑡) stands for standard Brownian motion on [0,1] and 𝑊∗(𝑡) = 𝑊(1) −
𝑊(𝑡). Also, notice that, 
{
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜃≤𝜏1≤𝜏2≤1−𝜃 |𝑊(𝜏1) −
𝜏1
𝜏2
𝑊(𝜏2)| = 𝑂𝑝(1),
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜃≤𝜏1≤𝜏2≤1−𝜃 |𝑊
∗(𝜏2) −
𝜏2
1−𝜏1
𝑊∗(𝜏1)| = 𝑂𝑝(1).
               (54) 
Thus, 𝑢𝑛
𝑖 (𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2), 𝑖 = 1,2 behaves similar to its mean, since 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜃≤𝜏1≤𝜏2≤1−𝜃|𝑢𝑛
𝑖 (𝑦, 𝜏1, 𝜏2) − 𝜇𝑛
𝑖 (𝜏1, 𝜏2)| = 𝑂𝑝 (𝑛
−
1
2) , 𝑖 = 1,2.               (55) 
Hereafter, the Nash equilibriums are sought. One can see that 𝜇1(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = 0 if  𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏1
∗. 
When, 𝜏1
∗ ≤ 𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏2
∗, then, 
𝜇1(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = {
−𝜑𝜏1(1 −
𝜏1
∗
𝜏2
) 𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏1
∗,
−𝜑𝑡1
∗(1 −
𝜏1
𝜏2
) 𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 > 𝜏1
∗.
               (56) 
When 𝑡2
∗ ≤ 𝜏2 ≤ 1, then,  
𝜇1(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
{
 
 
 
 
−𝜑
−𝜑
𝜏1
𝜏2
(𝜏2
∗ − 𝜏1
∗) 𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏1
∗,
{𝜏1
∗ (1 −
𝜏1
𝜏2
) − 𝜏1 (1 −
𝜏2
∗
𝜏2
)} 𝑖𝑓 𝜏1
∗ ≤ 𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏2
∗
𝜑 (1 −
𝜏1
𝜏2
) (𝜏2
∗ − 𝜏1
∗) 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝜏1 > 𝜏2
∗.
,               (57) 
By changing the 𝜏1 to 𝜏2 and 𝑡1
∗ to 𝑡2
∗, the mean function 𝜇2(𝜏1, 𝜏2) is derived. The 
best response of player 1 when the player 2 considers the change as 𝜏2 is given by,  
𝐵1(𝜏2) = {
[𝜃, 𝜏2] 𝜃 ≤ 𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏1
∗,
𝜏1
∗  𝜏1
∗ ≤ 𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏2
∗,
𝜏1
∗ 𝜏2
∗ ≤ 𝜏2 ≤ 1 − 𝜃.
             (58) 
If it is assumed that 𝜇1(𝜏1, 𝜏2) ≠ 0, then 𝐵1(𝜏2) = 𝜏1
∗. Similarly, 𝐵2(𝜏1) = 𝜏2
∗. 
This fact shows that the Nash equilibrium happens at (𝜏1
∗, 𝜏2
∗).  The following proposition 
summarizes the above discussion.  
Proposition 7. The Nash equilibriums of two-way FDI game occurs at the actual change 
points (𝜏1
∗, 𝜏2
∗).   
4. Two-Way FDI: Unknown States 
The unknown states case as an inevitable practical issue (Isermann, 2006) is 
considered here. Indeed, in Sections 2 and 3, the states are needed to be known. So, in 
this section, previous results and approaches are modified to be applicable for unknown 
state situations. LMI and Kalman filter methods are utilized to tackle this problem. 
4.1. LMI Application 
Here, without loss of generality, assume that the magnitude of change is negative, 
i.e., 𝜑 < 0. According to the results of Section 2, the null hypothesis 𝐻0 is rejected 
(against AMOC alternative hypothesis 𝐻1) for large value of test statistic 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡), 
where  
𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝜆𝑡
0.5(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
−0.5(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛),            (59) 
where 𝜆𝑡 =
𝑠𝑡
𝑠𝑛
, 𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑡
𝑖=1  for 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, and 𝑥 = {𝑥𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 1}, see Section 2. Values 
of 𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡)′𝑠 are attainable if the 𝑥𝑡 's are known. This approach is referred to as the player 
test statistic in Section 2. For the unknown states cases, following (Chung and Speyer, 
1998) and using a conservative approach, the null hypothesis 𝐻0  is rejected if, 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡) ≥ 𝑑,            (60) 
for some thresholds 𝑑′𝑠. These 𝑑′𝑠 are computed using the null distribution of 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡), such that  
𝑃𝐻0(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡) ≥ 𝑑) = 𝛼,            (61) 
for some desired significant level 1 − 𝛼.  Following Section 2, when the above-mentioned 
method is repeated for two players 1 and 2, a two-way FDI is made. To make inference, 
the asymptotic distribution of 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡) is needed. However, an alternative 
approach is the use of the LMI technique. 𝐻0 is rejected if for all 𝑥's 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡) ≥ 𝑑.           (62) 
Hence, 𝐻0 is retained (not rejected yet) if 𝑑 −𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡) ≤ 0, for some 𝑥's. This 
condition defines [𝑛(1 − 𝜃)] − [𝑛𝜃] numbers of LMI's for each 𝑡.  If the above inequality 
is solved by LMI and some 𝑥's are found, then 𝐻0 is not rejected. However, there is no 
guarantee that the 𝑥's found by LMI are the actual 𝑥's. To overcome this difficulty, using 
the Kalman filter, the actual 𝑥's are estimated and compared with the LMI 𝑥's by some 
criteria like mean square error and mean absolute percentage error. If these two series of 
𝑥's are close, then it is concluded that there is a change at the actual 𝑥's. 
To simplify the LMI problem, notice that the maximum of 𝜆𝑡
0.5(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
−0.5 is 
√𝜗/(1 − 𝜗), for some 𝜗 where  0 < 𝜆𝑡 < 𝜗, then the 𝐻0 is retained if 
𝑑′ −𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛) ≤ 0,          (63) 
where 𝑑′ = √(1 − 𝜗)/𝜗𝑑. This is an LMI solution. Therefore, the LMI is applied to find 
𝑥's.  
Hereafter, a different formulation of LMI is presented. Suppose that it is desired 
to test if there is a change at a specified point 𝑡. The null hypothesis 𝐻0  is rejected if 
𝐽(𝑥, 𝑡) > 𝑐𝑡, for some threshold 𝑐𝑡 's. One can see that it is equivalent to say that 
(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 )(∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ) − (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )(∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑡
𝑖=1 ) > 𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛
2√𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝑡).          (64) 
An alternative format of (64) is as, 
(∑ 𝑥𝑖
2 𝑦𝑖
𝑥𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 ) (∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ) − (∑ 𝑥𝑖
2 𝑦𝑖
𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) (∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑡
𝑖=1 ) > 𝑞𝑡 ,          (65) 
where 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛
2√𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝑡) ≤ 0.5𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛
2. Assume that 
𝐹𝑖 =
{
 
 
 
 [
𝑦𝑖
𝑥𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑥𝑖
1 1
] 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑡
[
0
𝑦𝑖
𝑥𝑖
0 1
]  𝑖 = 𝑡 + 1,… , 𝑛
.          (66) 
Then, inequality (∑ 𝑥𝑖
2 𝑦𝑖
𝑥𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 ) (∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ) − (∑ 𝑥𝑖
2 𝑦𝑖
𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) (∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑡
𝑖=1 ) > 0.5𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛
2 can be 
represented by [
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝐹𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 0.5𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛
2
𝐼 𝐼
] < 0 which defines a LMI problem. Here, unknown 
𝑥𝑖 's  of 𝐹𝑖 are estimated by Kalman filtering and 𝐼 is the identity matrix.  
4.2. Kalman Filter 
Here, via elaborating an example, the application of the Kalman filter to estimate 
the unknown states is described. Then, the differential game of Section 3.3 is applied for 
the unknown states case. It is seen that the differential game approach by using Kalman 
estimated states works well. A similar approach under the Bayesian setting for sensor FDI 
has been studied in (H. Habibi, Howard, et al., 2017).  
Consider a servo mechanism, whose transfer function 𝐺(𝑠) is as, 
𝐺(𝑠) =
1
𝑠(𝑠+1)(𝑠+2)
.            (67) 
The reference input 𝑟 is a unit step. The desired closed loop poles are chosen to 
be at 𝑠 = −2 ± 𝑗2√3 and 𝑠 = −10.  The state feedback controller is utilized to place the 
poles as desired values. The state space representation of this system is  
?̇?𝑡 = 𝑨𝒙𝒕 +  𝒃𝑢𝑡, 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝒄𝒕𝒙𝒕 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
(68) 
where 𝒙𝒕 = [𝑥1𝑡  𝑥2𝑡 𝑥3𝑡]
𝑇, 𝒄𝒕 = [𝛽𝑡 0 0], at which 
𝛽𝑡 = {
1    𝑡 ≤ 𝑡∗,
5    𝑡 > 𝑡∗,
            (69) 
where 𝑡∗ = 200. The control term is given by 𝑢𝑡 = −𝒌𝒙𝒕, 𝒌 = [160 54 11]. 
Coefficients of the state equation are 𝑨 = [
0
0
0
1
0
−2
0
1
−3
], 𝒃 = [0 0 1]𝑇. Vectors and matrices 
are represented by bolded small and capital letters, respectively. Here, 𝜀𝑡 's are 
independent random variables with common normal distribution 𝑁(0,0.25).  
The Kalman filter, which is used to estimate the states, is designed as 
?̇̂?𝑡 = 𝐴?̂?𝑡 + 𝒃𝒖𝒕 + 𝒌𝑓(𝑦𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡),          (70) 
where ?̂?, ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?1t and 𝒌𝑓 are the Kalman estimates of states, output and gain, 
respectively.  
The vector 𝒄𝑡 of the Kalman filter is [1 0 0], considering a latent fault in the 
sensor. On the other hand, to hold 𝑥1t = ?̂?1t, as the goal of the Kalman filter, the latent 
coefficient 𝛽𝑡 should be applied in vector 𝒄𝑡 of the Kalman filter. Accordingly, the 
Kalman filter (70) is modified as, 
?̇̂?𝑡 = 𝐴?̂?𝑡 + 𝒃𝒖𝒕 + 𝒌𝑓(𝑦𝑡 − 𝛽𝑡?̂?1t).         (71) 
So, by selecting the appropriate estimator gain, the estimated state via the Kalman 
filter, i.e. ?̂?1𝑡, will be close optimally to the term of  𝑥1𝑡/𝛽𝑡. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that the estimated state is not similar to the state 𝑥1, but rather to the 𝑥1𝑡/𝛽𝑡 
term, in which the coefficient 𝛽𝑡 is present (H. Habibi, Howard, et al., 2017).  
The differential game of Section 3 utilises the plot of ?̂?[𝑛𝑙] − ?̂?𝑛, 0 < 𝑙 < 1, for 
FDI purposes. This plot for dynamic system (68) with a sensor fault (69), using Kalman 
estimations of states instead of actual unknown states, is shown in Figure 6. It is seen that 
the differential game method is also applicable in the unknown states case. It should be 
noted that the data before the change point has negative effect on rate of convergence. 
Hence, a delay is observed. This problem can be removed via the windowed coefficient 
estimation, i.e. rolling analysis, which is surveyed as an illustrative example in Section 
5.2, Example 4. 
5. Illustrative examples, practical simulation and comparison 
In this section, initially, the finite sample distribution of the test statistic is 
simulated. Then, four illustrative examples are given with different fault scenarios to 
investigate the different characteristics of the two-way FDI method. Finally, the 
integrated servo mechanism with unknown states, as a practical example, is studied to 
evaluate the superiority of the proposed schemes. 
5.1. Finite sample distributions 
Here, the finite sample quantiles 𝑑′s of test statistic 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1  are derived at which 
𝑇𝑛,𝜃
1 > 𝑑 rejects the null hypothesis 𝐻0 of no change. Although, the large sample quantiles 
are derived in Section 2.3, however, often, in practical situations, finite samples are 
available. So finite sample quantiles are beneficial to be studied. Values of 𝑑′s are derived 
for various selections of sample size 𝑛, variance 𝜎𝜀
2, and states 𝑥𝑡 's. Three cases (a)-(c) 
are given, as follows. 
(a) First, suppose that states 𝑥𝑡 's are sorted 𝑛 independent uniform random 
variables with common uniform distribution on (0,1). The sensor parameter 𝑏1 = 1. Let 
𝜃 = 0.1. Table 3 gives the Monte Carlo estimation (based on 1000 repetitions) of the 
0.99-th quantile 𝑑 for various values of 𝑛 and 𝜎𝜀
2. 
 
 
 
Table 3. The 0.99-th quantile 𝑑, uniform states 
  𝜎𝜀  
  0.01 0.1 0.5 1 2 
n 
10 0.01434 0.14342 0.71714 1.43428 2.86856 
20 0.01143 0.11432 0.57164 1.14323 2.28658 
30 0.00998 0.09989 0.49946 0.99893 1.99786 
40 0.00809 0.08093 0.40468 0.80936 1.61873 
50 0.00784 0.07843 0.39219 0.78438 1.56876 
(b) Here, the finite sample quantiles are given for correlated states. Again, suppose 
that 𝑏1 = 1, and that states 𝑥𝑡 's come from 𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, where 𝑒𝑡 is normal 
standard random variable, 𝑢𝑡 = 𝐾𝑥𝑡, with 𝛼 = 0.1, 𝛾 = 0.5 and 𝐾 = 0.2. Let 𝜃 = 0.1. It 
is assumed 𝑒𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 are independent. Table 4 gives the 0.99-th quantile 𝑑 for various 
values of 𝑛 and 𝜎𝜀
2. 
Table 4. The 0.99-th quantile 𝑑, known states 
  𝜎𝜀  
  0.01 0.1 0.5 1 2 
n 
10 0.01247 0.12476 0.62381 1.24761 2.4952 
20 0.00941 0.094051 0.47025 0.94051 1.8811 
30 0.00615 0.061525 0.30762 0.61525 1.2305 
40 0.00485 0.04856 0.24281 0.48562 0.9712 
50 0.00387 0.03873 0.19365 0.38731 0.7746 
(c) Now assume that states 𝑥𝑡 's are unknown and estimated by the Kalman filter. 
Let 𝜃 = 0.1. Table 5 gives the mentioned quantiles for this case. It is worth noting that in 
both known and unknown cases, the 𝑑’s are similar. 
 
Table 5. The 0.99-th quantile 𝑑, Kalman filtering 
  𝜎𝜀  
  0.01 0.1 0.5 1 2 
n 
10 0.0112 0.1171 0.7476 1.9964 3.4734 
20 0.0080 0.0883 0.4778 1.0493 1.9838 
30 0.0069 0.0717 0.3527 0.6954 1.2143 
40 0.0061 0.0628 0.3132 0.6310 1.1916 
50 0.0056 0.0545 0.2841 0.5917 1.1449 
 
Finite sample (1 − 𝜁)%  quantiles of 𝑇𝑛,𝜃
2 , for 𝑛 = 50, 𝜃 = 0, 𝑏1 = 1, 𝜎𝜀 = 0.2, 
and 𝜋𝑡 = 1 for 𝑡 ∈ (0,1),  when the states are sorted, uniform observations in (0,1), are 
0.07594, 0.06578 and 0.05703 for 𝜁 = 0.01, 0.025 and 0.05, respectively.  When, 𝑥𝑡 =
𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, where 𝑒𝑡 's are normally distributed variables with zero mean and 
standard deviation 1, then mentioned quantiles are 0.0418, 0.0374 and 0.03345 for 𝜁 =
0.01, 0.025 and 0.05, respectively.  
Comparing Tables 3-5, almost in all cells, the smallest, largest and middle 
quantiles are known, uniform and Kalman states quantiles, respectively. As expected, 
larger 𝜎𝜀 leads to larger quantiles. Also, for larger 𝑛, quantiles converge to constant 
limiting value. The 99-th quantiles of known states are illustrated in Figure 7. For two 
other quantiles similar figure can be obtained.  
5.2. Illustrative examples 
Here, four illustrative examples are given. The first example computes the best 
response functions (15) of both players and the Nash equilibrium is derived. To show that 
the considered fault model (3) and the proposed FDI scheme is applicable in other fault 
models, sensor bias/fixed output and epidemic changes are studied in the second and third 
examples, respectively. The player test statistics and generally, game theoretic tools are 
obtained using the regular least square estimation of 𝛽𝑡. However, this estimation is 
disturbed with the past observations and this fact induces delays in fault diagnosis, as 
described in Section 4.2. To overcome this difficulty, the rolling estimations are used. So, 
in the last example the rolling estimation of a sensor coefficient at the change point is 
surveyed. 
Example 1: Best response functions. Assuming the ultimate change is 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑡, 𝑠), 
the best response functions of both players are given by (15) 
𝐵1(𝑠) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥1≤𝑡≤𝑛|𝑢min(𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛 |, 𝐵2(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥1≤𝑠≤𝑛|𝑢min(𝑡,𝑠)
𝑛 |.        (72) 
Also, these functions are 𝐵1
∗ and 𝐵2
∗, using the average 0.5(𝑠 + 𝑡) as the ultimate 
estimation of change, that is,   
𝐵1
∗(𝑠) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥1≤𝑡≤𝑛|𝑢0.5(𝑠+𝑡)
𝑛 |, 𝐵2
∗(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥1≤𝑠≤𝑛|𝑢0.5(𝑠+𝑡)
𝑛 |,        (73) 
where 𝑢𝑡
𝑛 = √𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
−1(?̂?
𝑡
− ?̂?
𝑛
) and 𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑡
𝑖=1  and 𝜆𝑡 =
𝑠𝑡
𝑠𝑛
, 𝑡 = 1,2,… , 𝑛.  
As follows Nash equilibriums are derived in three cases (a)-(c). 
(a) First, it is supposed that the 𝑥𝑡 's are sorted 𝑛 = 100 independent uniform 
random variables with common uniform distribution on (0,1). The change occurs at 𝑡∗ =
30 where 𝑏1 = 1, 𝑏2 = 3 and 𝜎𝜀 = 0.1. Figure 8 shows the graphs of functions 𝐵1 and 
𝐵2 which are the same. The graphs of 𝐵1
∗ and 𝐵2
∗ are also given in Figure 9. Both Figures 
8 and 9 show that the Nash equilibrium occurs at  𝑡 = 30. Although, apparently, Figure 
9 shows that the change has occurred at 𝑡 = 60, however, because of the functional form 
of the argument 0.5(𝑡 + 𝑠), it should be divided by 2 to derive the actual change point 
𝑡 = 30. 
(b) Again, suppose that 𝑏1 = 1, 𝑏2 = 3, 𝑛 = 100, 𝑡
∗ = 30 , and 𝜎𝜀 = 0.1. 
However, states 𝑥𝑡 's come from 𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, and 𝑢𝑡 = 𝐾𝑥𝑡, with 𝛼 =
0.1, 𝛾 = 0.5 and 𝐾 = 0.2. For this example, Figure 10 shows the plots of functions 𝐵1 
and 𝐵2 which are the same. Also, the graphs of 𝐵1
∗ and 𝐵2
∗ are given in Figure 11. Both 
Figures 10 and 11, show that the Nash equilibrium occurs at  𝑡 = 30. Similar to the 
reasoning of Figure 9, 𝑡 = 60 should be divided by 2 to derive the actual change point 
𝑡 = 30.   
(c) Figure 12 shows the graphs of functions 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 when the Kalman filtering 
is used to estimate the states in part (b). Again, it is seen that the Nash equilibrium occurs 
at 𝑡 = 30.  
Example 2: Sensor bias and sensor fixed output. These are two special cases of 
systems at which a fixed number (bias) is added to the output of a system (referred to as 
sensor bias) and the output of a system is fixed (referred to as sensor fixed output), see 
(Isermann, 2006). Consider cases (a)-(b), as follows 
(a) For the sensor bias case, let  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2, … ,1000,        (74) 
where 𝑥𝑡 's is a sorted sequence of 1000 random numbers uniformly distribution on (0,1), 
and 
𝜔𝑡 = {
0 𝑡 ≤ 450,
1 𝑡 ≥ 451.
        (75) 
Here, to study the change in the bias term of the system, the 𝛽𝑡 is assumed zero. Error 
terms 𝜀𝑡 's come from normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation 𝜎𝜀 =
0.5.  
To apply the two-way FDI, here, it is enough to let 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡 = (𝜔𝑡 × 1) + 𝜀𝑡.        (76) 
That is, the coefficient of the fixed sensor which is 1, suddenly changes at an unknown 
time point. This is a regression model similar to model (1). It is not difficult to see that 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝑧?̅?, 𝜆𝑡 =
𝑡
𝑛
  and  𝑢𝑡
𝑛 = √
𝑡
𝑛−𝑡
(𝑧?̅? − 𝑧?̅?).        (77) 
Figure 13 shows the time series of |𝑢𝑡
𝑛| indicating there is a change at 𝑡 = 450. It is seen 
that the maximum of this plot occurs at the actual change point out of the 95% quantile 
boundary, i.e., 0.35. Thus, similar to the arguments of the previous Section, the Nash 
equilibrium occurs at 𝑡 = 450, i.e. at the true change point. 
 (b) For the fixed output case, assume that 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2, … ,1000,        (78) 
where 𝛽𝑡 = 0 and 𝑤𝑡 = 1 for 𝑡 ≤ 450 and 𝛽𝑡 = 0 and 𝑤𝑡 = 2 for 𝑡 > 450. It should be 
noted that 𝛽𝑡 is selected to be 0 to make the effect of the bias apparent. Here, 𝑢𝑡
𝑛 of 
formula (13) reduces to  
𝑢𝑡
𝑛 = √
𝑡
𝑛−𝑡
(?̅?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑛),        (79) 
which is a suitable process to detect the change point. Obviously, the two-way FDI 
performs well, in this case.   
For another example, consider the following case 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2, … ,1000,        (80) 
where 𝛽𝑡 = 0 and 𝑤𝑡 = 1 for 𝑡 ≤ 450 and 𝛽𝑡 = 1 and 𝑤𝑡 = 2 for 𝑡 > 450. Here, 
𝑢𝑡
𝑛,∗ = √
𝜆𝑡
1−𝜆𝑡
(?̂?𝑡
∗ − ?̂?𝑛
∗),        (81) 
where ?̂?𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)/∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑡
𝑖=1 . Here, 𝜀𝑡 's are normal random variables with zero 
mean and standard deviation 0.1. Figure 14 shows the time series plot of |𝑢𝑡
𝑛,∗| which 
shows the change point at 𝑡 = 450 out of the 95% quantile boundary, i.e., 0.86. In this 
case, a two-step procedure is used to detect changes in both parameters 𝛽𝑡 and 𝑤𝑡. As 
soon as the change in 𝛽𝑡 is detected, to detect the change in 𝑤𝑡 , then let 𝑧𝑡
∗ = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝛽𝑡𝑥𝑡 
and use the process 
𝑢𝑡
𝑛,∗∗ = √
𝑡
𝑛−𝑡
(𝑧?̅?
∗ − 𝑧?̅?
∗).        (82) 
Example 3: Epidemic change. The epidemic change point is a special pattern of a 
multiple change point problem. Here, there are three segments (two change points) and 
the parameters of interest are the same for the first and third segments while the parameter 
in the middle segment has a different value. The epidemic pattern occurs in many fields 
such as medicine (influenza epidemics), meteorology (weather conditions, pollution), and 
seismology (earthquake), see (R. Habibi, et al., 2005). 
In this example, following (51), let 𝑛 = 600, [𝑛𝜏1] = 310, [𝑛𝜏2] = 400, 𝜎𝜀 = 0.1 and, 
as discussed in Section 3, let 𝑥𝑡 = 1 for all 𝑡
′s. The change in 𝛽𝑡 is as  
𝛽𝑡 = {
1 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 310,
3.25 311 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 400
1 401 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 600.
,        (83) 
Considering (51), the payoff functions of players 1 and 2 are given as  
{
𝑢1(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?[𝑛𝜏2])
[𝑛𝜏1]
𝑖=1 ,
𝑢2(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑦𝑛−𝑖+1 − ?̅?[𝑛𝜏1]
∗ ),
[𝑛𝜏2]
𝑖=1
        (84) 
respectively. The best response of player 1 when the player 2 chooses the strategy 𝜏2 is, 
𝐵1(𝜏2) =
{
 
 
 
 ℎ(𝜏1) 𝑖𝑓 𝜏2 ≤
310
600
,
310
600
𝑖𝑓 
310
600
< 𝜏2 ≤
400
600
310
600
 𝑜𝑟 
400
600
𝑖𝑓 𝜏2 >
400
600
,
,        (85) 
where ℎ is often a non-decreasing function of 𝜏1 (see, Figures 15 (a) and (b)). In the third 
row of formula (85), the best response of player 1 is 310/600 𝑜𝑟 400/600 depending if 
𝑢1(310/600, 𝜏2) > 𝑢1(400/600, 𝜏2) is true or not. However, it is true that the 𝐵1(𝜏2) is 
a step function after 310/600 and its value is 310/600 (see, Figures 15 (a) and (b)). A 
similar fact is true for 𝐵2(𝜏1). To find the Nash equilibrium estimate of the first change 
point (which is 
310
600
, actually), it is enough to find the intersection of 𝐵1([𝑛𝜏2]) and line 
[𝑛𝜏1] = [𝑛𝜏2]. The intersection of 𝐵2(𝜏1) and line 𝜏1 = 𝜏2 gives the Nash equilibrium 
estimate of the second change point with actual value 
400
600
. Figures 15 (a) and (b) show the 
best response functions 𝐵1([𝑛𝜏2]) and 𝐵2([𝑛𝜏1]), respectively. Figure 15 (a) indicates 
that there exists a change at time 310 and Figure 15 (b) implies that there is another 
change at time 600 − 200 = 400.  
Example 4: Rolling sensor estimate. The rolling analysis is applied for capturing 
the instability of model parameters over time. It is an important technique widely used in 
financial time series analysis, see (Alexander, 2001) and references therein. Rolling 
sensor coefficients are the least square estimates of 𝛽𝑡 computed using windowed 
samples. The data in the 𝑖-th sample is indexed by 𝑖 = 𝑡 − 𝑙 + 1,… , 𝑡. The rolling 
estimations of 𝛽𝑡 over a rolling window of size 𝑙 is given by 
?̂?𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝑡 = ?̂?𝑙,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑥𝑡−𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=0
∑ 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
2𝑙
𝑖=0
.        (86) 
Under 𝐻0 and AMOC model, then 𝐸(?̂?𝑙,𝑡) = 𝑏1, 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑛. This fact motivates one to 
use the CUMSUM ?̂?𝑙,𝑡, as a useful tool for change point detection. Similar to the previous 
Section, the utility function of player 1 is given by, 
𝑢1(𝜏) =
1
𝑛
∑ (?̂?𝑙,𝑡 − ?̅̂?) ,
[𝑛𝜏]
𝑖=1         (87) 
where ?̅̂? is the sample mean of ?̂?𝑙,𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 − 𝑙. To obtain the utility function of the 
second player, it is enough to calculate the rolling estimate of length 𝑙 using observations 
(𝑥𝑛−𝑖+1, 𝑦𝑛−𝑖+1), 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 and then compute the corresponding CUMSUM method. 
The best response functions of both players are plotted in Figure 16. Here, 𝑛 = 1000, 
𝑡∗ = 350, 𝑏1 = 1, 𝑏2 = 2.67, 𝜎𝜀 = 0.1 and 𝑥𝑡 's are sorted uniform variables on (0,1). The 
length of the rolling window is 𝑙 = 10. This shows that the Nash equilibrium estimation 
is the actual change point.  
5.2. Practical example and comparison 
In this section, the servo mechanism system, as introduced in Section 4.2, is 
considered to evaluate the performance of the two-way FDI method. Also, a comparison 
with CUMSUM method, as a one of the widely used FDI approaches (Isermann, 2006), 
is made to verify the advantages and benefits of the two-way FDI method. Here, the states 
𝑥𝑡 's are assumed unknown, which is the case in most practical dynamic systems. Hence, 
as explained in Sections 4.2, the Kalman filter is utilized to estimate the 𝑥𝑡 's. The servo 
mechanism considered in this section, is an integrated system, i.e., the output of a system 
is not observed directly, and instead a cumulative level of it exists for FDI purposes, 
inevitably. Integrated volatility and ice-core data on oxygen isotopes are two examples of 
integrated systems (Baltazar-Larios and Sørensen, 2010). In the integrated system, the 
available output is the integration of 𝑦𝑡 as  
 𝑦𝑡
∗ = ∫ 𝑦𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠.        (88) 
As the output 𝑦𝑡 is integrated and hence it is non-stationary in mean, so it is necessary 
that the regressors 𝑥𝑡 's are integrated. Indeed, it is not true to represent the non-stationary 
output 𝑦𝑡 by a set of stationary regressors 𝑥𝑡 's, because when 𝑥𝑡 's are non-stationary, it is 
possible to detect spurious change (Hsu, 2001).  
As follows, it is shown that the CUMSUM procedure has weak performance while 
two game theoretic procedures including best response (Section 2.2) and differential 
game (Section 4.2) methods have strong performance.  To this end, consider the dynamic 
system (68), with a sensor fault (69) where the Kalman filter (70) is used to estimate the 
state. Also, assume only that the integrated output 𝑦𝑡
∗ is available for FDI purpose. The 
estimation of 𝑦𝑡
∗ using the Kalman filter estimated output is computed as ?̂?𝑡
∗ = ∫ ?̂?𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠. 
Two-way FDI methods applied here are the best response function (Section 2.2) and the 
differential game (Section 4.2).  
Here, a CUMSUM method with estimated states, using the Kalman filter, is 
applied to the scaled series ℎ𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
 (Isermann, 2006). Since, the expectation of  ℎ𝑡 is 𝛽𝑡, 
i.e., 𝐸(ℎ𝑡) = 𝛽𝑡, thus, the partial sum of the mean corrected series ℎ𝑡 − ℎ̅, i.e., 
∑ (ℎ𝑖 − ℎ̅)
𝑡
𝑖=1 , referred to as the CUMSUM method (Isermann, 2006), detects the changes 
in mean 𝛽𝑡. Indeed, the maximiser of CUMSUM is the change point estimation. The 
CUMSUM plot with Kalman estimated states is illustrated in Figure 17. Accordingly, the 
change point estimation is 8 which is far from the actual change point 200. It is seen that 
the CUMSUM method does not represent the change in 𝛽𝑡 at the actual time and instead 
provides a spurious change point at 8. In previous sections, it was seen that when states 
are known 𝑦𝑡/𝑥𝑡 is a proxy for 𝛽𝑡, since 𝐸(𝑦𝑡/𝑥𝑡) = 𝛽𝑡, and using this stylized fact, based 
on CUMSUM method, pure and mixed Nash equilibriums are derived. However, when 
states are unknown, a straightforward suggestion is to use the Kalman estimation of states 
and consider the CUMSUM of 𝑦𝑡/𝑥𝑡. By the way, it is seen that this method does not 
detect the change point. This is why the differential game approach based on Kalman 
estimation of states and best response method using the LMI solutions are used in the 
unknown states case in Section 4. For the differential game approach, the ?̂?𝑡’s 𝑡 =
1,2, … ,1000 are computed. Then, the time series plot of ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑛 (with 𝑐 = −0.4, see 
Section 3.3) is shown in Figure 18. It is seen that the actual change point is the first point 
at which the mentioned plot starts to depart from its initial mean. This plot indicates that 
the change point estimation is 200. Next, for the best response function approach, the 
time series plot of |𝑢𝑡
𝑛| result is plotted in Figure 19. Clearly, it crosses the threshold 𝑑 =
0.036 which is the 95% quantile boundary (see Sections 2.3 and 5.1) and takes its 
maximum at the actual change point. The best response functions of both players are 
plotted in Figure 20. It is seen again that the Nash equilibrium is the 𝑠 = 𝑡 = 200. 
To study the sensitivity analysis with respect to standard deviation 𝜎𝜀, as an 
important parameter in FDI problems, for 𝜎𝜀 = [0.01,0.1], fault estimations ?̂?𝑖, 𝑖 =
br, dg, cu are derived. Notations br, dg and cu stand for best response, differential game, 
and CUMSUM methods, respectively. It is seen that ?̂?br = ?̂?dg = 200 which shows that 
both game theoretic methods detect the change point accurately, and ?̂?cu = 8 which shows 
poor performance for the CUMSUM method. However, the two-way game theoretic FDI 
approaches have good performance, in the integrated system, when the location of the 
actual change point is too close to the beginning of the data sequence as mentioned in 
Section 1, Point 9, as well as two-way FDI methods provide two change estimators and 
by considering the mean of two estimators as the ultimate change estimator, the variance 
of the ultimate estimator reduces (see Section 1, Point 4).  
Here, the reason for good performance of two-way game theoretic FDI methods 
compared to CUMSUM is explained. Assuming ?̂?𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡, as well as, 𝑦𝑡
∗ and ?̂?𝑡
∗ are close 
to each other, the Kalman filter produces a linear relation between ∫ 𝑦𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 and ∫ 𝑥𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠, 
with the slope 𝛽𝑡. Thus, using the Kalman outputs of an integrated system, which are  
∫ 𝑥𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 and ∫ 𝑦𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 instead of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡, provides the estimation of ?̂?𝑡 very close to the 
actual 𝛽𝑡 when 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡 are used in ?̂?𝑡. Therefore, differential game or best response 
methods which are based on ?̂?𝑡, perform properly. However, it is not true for the 
CUMSUM method because it can be simply shown that 𝐸 (
∫ 𝑦𝑠
𝑡
0 𝑑𝑠
∫ 𝑥𝑠
𝑡
0 𝑑𝑠 
) =
∫ 𝛽𝑠𝑥𝑠
𝑡
0 𝑑𝑠
∫ 𝑥𝑠
𝑡
0 𝑑𝑠
≠ 𝛽𝑡. 
Finally, if it can be guaranteed that the available data is integrated, then 𝑦𝑡 can be obtained 
via differentiation of 𝑦𝑡
∗. Then 𝑥𝑡 can be estimated by the Kalman filter, to which 𝑥𝑡 and 
𝑦𝑡 are fed. Consequently, the mentioned problem is eliminated in the CUMSUM method. 
However, it is really challenging to ensure that the given data are integrated, in the 
presence of a fault. Also, differentiation of 𝑦𝑡
∗ leads to noise amplification problems. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, sensor fault detection was formulated as change point analysis of a 
linear regression coefficient. The purpose of the paper was application of the game 
theoretic concepts such as Nash equilibrium and best response functions, to the sensor 
FDI. Two-way FDI method was introduced at which two players investigate from both 
sides of the data sequence to detect faults. In the AMOC model, via minimizing the bias 
of estimation of parameters before and after the change point, the two-way FDI game was 
introduced and it was seen that the Nash equilibrium occurs at the actual change point. 
Also, the corporative and the competitive game frameworks were introduced in two-way 
FDI and corresponding Nash equilibriums were derived which occur at the actual change 
points. Also, the players’ test statistics were given, and their asymptotic null distributions 
were obtained, to test the existence of the change point, individually by each player. In 
the known states case, the differential game was presented, and it was confirmed that 
Nash equilibrium is the true change point. Also, in the unknown states case, Kalman filter 
and LMI were used to estimate the states. Then via the differential game, accurate results 
were obtained, similar to the known states case ones. Numerical results showed that the 
two-way FDI scheme accurately detects the change point, for various fault scenarios. 
Finally, an integrated servo mechanism was used to evaluate the superiority of proposed 
scheme compared to the CUMSUM Method.  
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